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ABSTRACT
A multi-parameter sensitivity analysis of a Bayesian network (BN) used in the digital forensic
investigation of the Yahoo! email case has been performed using the principle of ‘steepest gradient’ in
the parameter space of the conditional probabilities. This procedure delivers a more reliable result for
the dependence of the posterior probability of the BN on the values used to populate the conditional
probability tables (CPTs) of the BN. As such, this work extends our previous studies using singleparameter sensitivity analyses of BNs, with the overall aim of more deeply understanding the
indicative use of BNs within the digital forensic and prosecutorial processes. In particular, we find that
while our previous conclusions regarding the Yahoo! email case are generally validated by the results
of the multi-parameter sensitivity analysis, the utility of performing the latter analysis as a means of
verifying the structure and form adopted for the Bayesian network should not be underestimated.
Keywords: Bayesian network; digital forensics; multi-parameter sensitivity analysis; steepest
gradient.
1. INTRODUCTION
The use of Bayesian networks (BNs) to assist in digital forensic investigations of e-crimes is
continuing to increase [Kwan, 2008; Kwan, 2010; Kwan, 2011] since they offer a valuable means of
reasoning about the relationship between the recovered (or expected) digital evidential traces and the
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forensic sub-hypotheses that explain how the suspected e-crime was committed [Kwan, 2008].
One of the principal difficulties encountered in constructing BNs is to know what conditional
probability values are appropriate for populating the conditional probability tables (CPTs) that are
found at each node of the BN. These values can be estimated by means of a survey questionnaire of a
group of experienced experts [Kwan , 2008] but as such they are always open to challenge. There are
also a number of alternative methods for estimating CPT values, including reasoning from historical
databases, but none are entirely exempt from the potential criticism of lacking quantitative rigour. In
these circumstances it is important to know how sensitive the posterior output of the BN is to the
numerical values of these parameters. If the degree of sensitivity can be shown to be low then the
precise values adopted for these parameters is not critical to the stability of the posterior output of the
BN.
In this paper we generalize the concept of sensitivity value introduced by Renooij and van der Gaag
[Renooij, 2004] to a multi-parameter space and adapt the concept of steepest gradient from the domain
of numerical optimization to define a local multi-parameter sensitivity value in the region of the
chosen parameter set. This metric defines the steepest gradient at the chosen point in the parameter
space, which is a direct measure of the local multi-parameter sensitivity of the BN. It should be
emphasised that in this work we are not aiming to optimize either the conditional probabilities or the
posterior output of the BN as was the case with the multi-parameter optimization scheme of Chan and
Darwiche [Chan, 2004]; our objective here is to measure the stability of the latter with respect to
simultaneous small variations of the former by determining the steepest local gradient in the multiparameter space.
2. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A number of types of BN sensitivity analysis have been proposed. The most straightforward, although
tedious, is the direct manipulation method which involves the iterative variation of one parameter at a
time, keeping all the others fixed. This single-parameter approach was used to demonstrate the low
sensitivity of the BitTorrent BN in [Overill, 2010]. Three somewhat more sophisticated approaches to
single-parameter sensitivity analysis, namely, bounding sensitivity analysis, sensitivity value analysis
and vertex likelihood analysis were proposed in [Renooij, 2004], and were each applied to the Yahoo!
Email BN to demonstrate its low sensitivity in [Kwan, 2011]. However, a valid criticism of each of
these single-parameter approaches is that the effect of simultaneous variation of the parameters is not
considered. The multi-parameter sensitivity analysis scheme proposed in [Chan, 2004] requires the
determination of kth-order partial derivatives with an associated computational complexity of
O(n
in order to perform a k-way sensitivity analysis on a BN of tree-width w with n
parameters where F(Xi) is the size of CPT i. In order to develop a computationally tractable approach
to local multi-parameter BN sensitivity analysis, we have generalized the original concept of the
single-parameter sensitivity value [Renooij, 2004] to multi-parameter space and then applied the
steepest gradient approach from numerical optimization to produce a metric for the local (or
instantaneous) multi-parameter sensitivity value at the selected point in parameter space.
3. YAHOO! CASE (HONG KONG)
3.1 Background of Yahoo! Case (Hong Kong)
On April 20, 2004, Chinese journalist Shi Tao used his private Yahoo! email account and sent a brief
of Number 11 document which was released by the Chinese government that day, to an overseas web
site called Asia Democracy Foundation. When the Chinese government found it out, Beijing State
Security Bureau requested the e-mail service provider, Yahoo! Holdings (Hong Kong) to provide
details of the sender’s personal information, like identifying information, login times, and e-mail
contents. According to Article 45 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (“Article 45”), Yahoo! Holding
(Hong Kong) was legally obliged to comply with the demand. Mr. Shi was accused with the crime of
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“providing state secrets to foreign entities.” After the course of investigation, Mr. Shi was convicted
and sentenced to ten years in prison in 2005 [Case No. 29, 2005].
In [Cap.486, 2007], it mentioned that:
“In the verdict (the “Verdict”) delivered by the People’s Court on 27 April 2005, it stated that Mr.
Shi had on 20 April 2004 at approximately 11:32 p.m. leaked information to “an overseas hostile
element, taking advantage of the fact that he was working overtime alone in his office to connect
to the internet through his phone line and used his personal email account (huoyan1989@yahoo.com.cn) to send his notes. He also used the alias ‘198964’ as the name of the
provider …”. The Verdict reported the evidence gathered to prove the commission of the offence
which included the following: “Account holder information furnished by Yahoo! Holdings (Hong
Kong) Ltd., which confirms that for IP address 218.76.8.21 at 11:32:17 p.m. on April 20, 2004,
the corresponding user information was as follows: user telephone number: 0731-4376362 located
at the Contemporary Business News office in Hunan; address: 2F, Building 88, Jianxing New
Village, Kaifu District, Changsha.”
3.2 Digital Evidence in Yahoo! Case (Hong Kong)
From the above verdict, we can tell that the information provided by Yahoo! Holdings (Hong Kong)
Ltd. is taken as the digital evidences in the court. Since we utilize a Bayesian Network as our analysis
model, we have to construct a Hypothesis-Evidence system. In this case, the main (or root) hypothesis
is:

Hypothesis H0: “The seized computer has been used to send the material document as an
email attachment via a Yahoo! Web mail account”
Under the main hypothesis, we have six sub-hypotheses and their corresponding evidences which are
listed below:
Table 1 Sub-hypothesis H1: Linkage between the
material document and the suspect’s computer.

ID

Description

DE1

The subject document exists
in the computer

DE2

The “Last Access Time” of
the subject file lags behind
the IP address assignment
time by the ISP

Digital

DE3

The “Last Access Time” of
the subject file lags behind
or closes to the sent time of
the Yahoo! email

Digital

Table 2 Sub-hypothesis H2: Linkage between the
suspect and his computer.

Evidence
Type

ID

Digital

PE1

The suspect was in physical
possession of the computer

Physical

DE4

Files in the computer reveals
the identity of the suspect

Digital
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Table 3 Sub-hypothesis H3: Linkage between the
suspect and the ISP

ID

Description

DE5

The ISP subscription details
(including the assigned IP
address) matches the
suspect’s particulars

Table 4 Sub-hypothesis H4: Linkage between the
suspect and Yahoo! email account

ID

Evidence
Type

Digital

Table 5 Sub-hypothesis H5: Linkage between the
computer and the ISP

ID

Description

DE7

Configuration setting of the
ISP Internet account is
found in the computer

Digital

DE8

Log data confirms that the
computer was powered up
at the time when the email
was sent

Digital

DE9

Web browsing program
(e.g. Internet Explorer) or
email user agent program
(e.g. Outlook) is found
activated at the time the
email was sent

Digital

DE10

Log data reveals the
assigned IP address and the
assignment time by the ISP
to the computer

Digital

DE11

ISP confirms the
assignment of the IP
address to the suspect’s
account

Digital

DE6

Description

Evidence
Type

The subscription details
(including the IP address
that sent the email) of the
Yahoo! email account
matches the suspect’s
particulars

Digital

Table 6 Sub-hypothesis H6: Linkage between the
computer and Yahoo! email account

Evidence
Type

ID

Description

DE12

Internet history logs reveal
the access of the Yahoo!
email account by the
computer

Digital

DE13

Internet cached files reveal
the subject document has
been sent as an attachment
via the Yahoo! email
account

Digital

DE14

Yahoo! confirms the IP
address of the Yahoo!
email with the attached
document

Digital

Evidence
Type

3.3 CPT values for Sub-Hypothesis and Evidence in Yahoo! Case (Hong Kong)
Before we set up the Bayesian Network, we have to obtain the CPT values of sub-hypothesis and
evidence. In this study, all of the probability values are assigned by subjective beliefs based on expert
professional opinion and experience in digital forensic analysis [Kwan, 2011]. From Table-7, we can
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see there are two states for hypothesis H0 – “yes” and “no”, and also for sub-hypotheses H1 to H6. For
the CPT values between sub-hypothesis and evidence, there are still two states for each sub-hypothesis
– “yes” and “no”, but three states for each evidence – “yes”, “no” and “uncertain”. State “uncertain”
means the evidence cannot be concluded to be either positive (“yes”) or negative (“no”) after
examination of the evidence.
Table 7 Likelihood value for sub-hypothesis H1 to H6 given hypothesis H

H1, H5, H6

H2, H3, H4

State

“yes”

“no”

“yes”

“no”

H = “yes”

0.65

0.35

0.8

0.2

H = “no”

0.35

0.65

0.2

0.8

Table 8 Conditional probability values for DE1 to DE3 given
sub-hypothesis H1

DE1

Table 9 Conditional probability values
for DE4 given sub-hypothesis H2

DE4

DE2, DE3

State

yes

no

u

yes

no

u

State

yes

no

u

H1 = yes

0.85

0.15

0

0.8

0.15

0.05

H2 = yes

0.75

0.2

0.05

H1 = no

0.15

0.85

0

0.15

0.8

0.05

H2 = no

0.2

0.75

0.05

Table 10 Conditional probability values for DE5
given sub-hypothesis H3

Table 11 Conditional probability values for DE6
given sub-hypothesis H4

DE6

DE5
State

yes

no

u

State

yes

no

u

H3 = yes

0.7

0.25

0.05

H4 = yes

0.1

0.85

0.05

H3 = no

0.25

0.7

0.05

H4 = no

0.05

0.9

0.05

Table 12 Conditional probability values for DE7 to DE11 given sub-hypothesis H5

DE7, DE8, DE10

DE9, DE11

State

yes

no

u

yes

no

u

H5 = yes

0.7

0.25

0.05

0.8

0.15

0.05

H5 = no

0.25

0.7

0.05

0.15

0.8

0.05
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Table 13 Conditional probability values for DE12 to DE14 given sub-hypothesis H6

DE12, DE13

DE14

State

yes

no

u

yes

no

u

H6 = yes

0.7

0.25

0.05

0.8

0.15

0.05

H6 = no

0.25

0.7

0.05

0.15

0.8

0.05

4. LOCAL MULTI-PARAMETER SENSITIVITY VALUE
4.1 Conditional Independence
Before we proceed with the multi-parameter sensitivity value, we have to discuss the relationship
between each sub-hypothesis and its set of evidences. In the Yahoo! case, the connections between
sub-hypothesis and evidences belong to the class of diverging connections in a Bayesian network
[Taroni, 2006] (see Figure 1). In a diverging connection model, E1 and E2 are conditionally
independent given H. This means that: (1) with the knowledge of H, the state of E1 does not change
the belief about the possible states of E2.
; (2) without the
knowledge of H, the state of E1 provides information about the possible states of E2.

H
E2
E1
Figure 1: Diverging Connection Bayesian Network
In general, we cannot conclude that E1 and E2 are also conditionally independent given . However,
for some special cases, if there are only two possible (mutually complementary) values for H, H={H1,
H2}, then given “H=H1”, E1 and E2 are conditionally independent, while, given “H=H2”, E1 and E2 are
also conditionally independent. Hence we can conclude that E1 and E2 are also conditionally
independent given .
4.2 Multi-Parameter Sensitivity Value
Under the standard assumption of proportional co-variation [Renooij, 2004] the theorems
characterizing the algebraic structure of marginal probabilities [Castillo, 1997] permit the singleparameter sensitivity function of [Renooij, 2004] to be generalized to the multi-parameter case as
follows:
If the parameters are given by x = (x1, …, xn) then the sensitivity function F is given by the multilinear quotient:

The components of the gradient vector are given by:
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The multi-parameter sensitivity value is the value of the steepest gradient at the point x and is given by
the Euclidean norm of the gradient vector
:

This last result follows from the first order Taylor expansion of F:

(4)
In principle the multi-linear forms in the numerator and the denominator of F are both of order n and
contain 2n terms leading to expressions for each
containing 22n terms in both numerator and
denominator. However, this analysis does not take into account the conditional dependencies implied
by the structure of the BN. If the BN can be represented as a set of m sub-hypotheses Hj (j=1, m), each
of which is conditionally dependent on a disjoint subset Ei (i=1, n) containing nj (j=1,m) of the set of n
evidential traces, so that
, then the total number of parameters is given by
,
but each Hj is conditionally dependent only upon its own subset of nj evidential traces. This is known
as the local Markov property of the BN. Although the conditional probabilities associated with subhypothesis Hj will influence those associated with sub-hypothesis Hk (j≠k) via the process of
Bayesian inference propagation through the network [Kwan, 2008], to a reasonable first
approximation the sensitivity values for each sub-hypothesis may be evaluated by disregarding these
indirect effects. Then, for the sub-hypotheses
is a multi-linear quotient of order m, while for the
evidential traces associated with sub-hypothesis Hj
is a multi-linear quotient of order nj. The
Markov factorisation of the BN thus substantially reduces the number of terms involved in the
expressions for
and
. Nevertheless a symbolic algebraic manipulation program, such as
MatLab [MathWorks, 2011], is required to perform the differentiations and computations reliably for a
BN representing a real-world situation such as the Yahoo! email case.
In order to derive the coefficients of the multinomial quotient for
formula for the likelihood conditional probability is:

we proceed as follows. Bayes’

Considering the conjunctive combination of the evidential traces {E1, E2, …, En}, (5) transforms into:

Then we obtain the multi-parameter posterior probability as:

Here,
As mentioned in Section 4.1, given H, E1, E2, …, En are conditionally independent of each other.
Therefore,
According to the definition of conditional independence, we cannot in general assume that E1, E2, …,
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En are conditionally independent of each other under . However, in the specific Yahoo! email case,
there are only two possible (mutually complementary) states for each hypothesis. Therefore, we also
have:
Denoting
,
, …,
by x1, x2, … xn, and
by c1, c2, … cn, we obtain the multi-parameter Sensitivity Function as:

As

an

un-biased

pre-condition,

it is usual to
, so (11) simplifies to:

take

,

the

prior

, …,

probabilities

as:

When finding the sensitivity value of the posterior of the root node H0, it is necessary to use a variant
of (3), namely, the weighted Euclidean norm of the sensitivity values of the individual sub-hypotheses:

where
is the multi-parameter sensitivity value of sub-hypothesis is the multi-parameter
sensitivity value of sub-hypothesis j as given by (3), reflecting the different contributions of the
individual sub-hypotheses to the posterior of H0.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Table 14 the multi-parameter sensitivity values for each sub-hypothesis of BN for the Yahoo! case
[Kwan, 2011] are set out and compared with the corresponding single-parameter sensitivity values
from [Kwan, 2011]. Before proceeding to discuss these results, however, it should be mentioned at
this point that while validating the MatLab code for the multi-parameter sensitivity values, a number
of numerical discrepancies were noted when reproducing the previously reported single-parameter
sensitivity values ([Kwan, 2011], Table 4). All but one of these discrepancies are not numerically
significant in terms of the conclusions drawn; however, in the case of digital evidential trace DE6 the
correct sensitivity value is actually 2.222, not 0.045, which implies that the effect of DE 6 on the
posterior of H4 should be significant. This revised result brings the single-parameter sensitivity value
for DE6 into line with the vertex proximity value for DE6 ([Kwan, 2011], Table 5) which indicated that
the posterior of H4 is indeed sensitive to variations in DE6, thereby resolving the apparent
disagreement between the two sensitivity metrics for the case of DE 6 noted in [Kwan, 2011]. The
corrected results for the single-parameter sensitivity values are given in Table 14 below. However, a
review of sub-hypothesis H4 reveals that it is not critical to the prosecution case since its associated
evidence DE6 is only weakly tied into the case; the fact that Mr Shi registered with Yahoo! for a
webmail account at some time in the past cannot be assigned a high probative value and this is
reflected in the ‘non-diagonal’ structure of the corresponding CPT (see Table 11), unlike all the other
CPTs in this BN.
It is reasonable to interpret the significance of a sensitivity value by comparing it with unity [Renooij,
2004; Kwan, 2011]; a value below unity implies a lack of sensitivity to small changes in the associated
conditional probability parameters, and vice versa. In other words, a sensitivity value less than unity
implies that the response of the BN is smaller than the applied perturbation. It cannot be assumed that
single-parameter sensitivity values as computed in [Kwan, 2011] are necessarily either smaller or
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larger than the corresponding multi-parameter sensitivity values computed here, since the form of the
sensitivity function being used is not identical. In the Yahoo! email case, three of the sub-hypotheses,
namely H2, H3 and H4, are associated with only a single evidential trace so each of their sensitivity
values is unchanged in the multi-parameter analysis. Of the three remaining sub-hypotheses, H1 and H6
both have three associated evidential traces whereas H5 has five.
Table 14: Single- and multi-parameter sensitivity values for H1 – H6 of the Yahoo! email case
Digital
Evidence

Single-parameter
Sensitivity value

Component j
of Multiparameter
Sensitivity value

DE1

0.1500

0.0125

DE2

0.1662

0.0134

DE3

0.1662

0.0134

H2

DE4

0.2216

0.2216

0.2216

H3

DE5

0.2770

0.2770

0.2770

H4

DE6

2.2222

2.2222

2.2222

DE7

0.2770

0.0051

DE8

0.2770

0.0051

DE9

0.1662

0.0045

DE10

0.2770

0.0051

DE11

0.1662

0.0045

DE12

0.2770

0.0565

DE13

0.2770

0.0565

DE14

0.1662

0.0494

Sub-hypothesis

H1

H5

H6

Multi-parameter
Sensitivity value

0.0225

0.0110

0.0939

From Table 14 it will be noted that, with the exception of the somewhat anomalous case of H4
discussed earlier, the largest multi-parameter sensitivity value is an order of magnitude smaller than
the smallest of the single-parameter sensitivity values reported previously [Kwan, 2011]. This finding
is at first sight somewhat surprising in that it might be expected that permitting many parameters to
vary simultaneously would produce the opportunity for greater sensitivity values to be found.
However, it must be remembered that, unlike the case of classical numerical optimization, the
parameters of the BN are not completely independent due to the conditional independence referred to
in Section 4.1 as well as the interdependence produced by the propagation of belief (posterior
probabilities) through the BN [Kwan, 2008]. In certain circumstances, these forms of co-variance can
result in smaller multi-parameter sensitivity values than might otherwise have been anticipated, as
explained below.
In Table 15 we give the single- and multi-parameter sensitivity values for the root node H0. The multiparameter sensitivity value is computed using the weighted Euclidean norm given in (12).
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Table 15: Single- and multi-parameter sensitivity values for H0 of the Yahoo! email case

Root
hypothesis

H0

Subhypothesis

Singleparameter
Sensitivity
value

Component
of
Multiparameter
Sensitivity
value

H1

0.3500

0.0064

0.0225

H2

0.2000

0.0030

0.2216

H3

0.2000

0.0030

0.2770

H4

0.2000

0.0030

2.2222

H5

0.3500

0.0037

0.0110

H6

0.3500

0.0037

0.0939

Weight of
Component

Multiparameter
Sensitivity
value

0.0052

The multi-parameter sensitivity results in Tables 14 and 15 raise a number of important issues for
discussion. Firstly, it appears that a multi-parameter sensitivity analysis should be performed in every
case in which a BN is used to reason about digital evidence. Since a multi-parameter sensitivity
analysis can often yield substantially different sensitivity values from a single-parameter sensitivity
analysis, it is necessary to assess the sensitivity of the posterior output of the BN as rigorously as
possible before putting forward forensic conclusions based on that BN. In the present Yahoo! email
case we found consistently smaller multi-parameter sensitivity values than the corresponding singleparameter results, but further investigations have shown that this is by no means a universal trend. By
creating CPTs with different ratios of ‘diagonal’ to ‘off-diagonal’ values we have been able to explore
the circumstances under which the multi-parameter sensitivity analysis is likely to yield larger values
than the corresponding single-parameter analysis. Table 16 offers a few such examples. In particular
we find that when the structure of one or more CPT tables deviates significantly from the typical
‘diagonal’ form, as was the case with H4-DE6 here, then the single- and multi-parameter sensitivity
values will increase towards and quite possibly exceed unity. This observation can be understood as
follows: A typically ‘diagonal’ CPT signifies that the truth or falsehood of the sub-hypothesis strongly
predicts the presence or absence of the associated evidence; they are logically tightly-coupled, which
is a highly desirable property. An anomalously ‘non-diagonal’ CPT, however, signals that there is
little correlation between the truth of the sub-hypothesis and the presence or absence of the evidence.
In other words, the evidence is a very poor indicator of the truth of the sub-hypothesis, and does not
discriminate effectively. This manifests itself as a steep gradient on the associated CPT parameters’
hyper-surface indicating the direction of a ‘better’ choice of parameters. Similarly, a combination of
‘diagonal’ and ‘non-diagonal’ CPTs associated with the same sub-hypothesis can create a numerical
tension or balance between the belief reinforcing effects propagated by the former and the belief
weakening effects propagated by the latter, resulting in an increased sensitivity value.
Secondly, the above observations lead us to propose that single- and multi-parameter sensitivity
analyses can be effectively employed to test an existing BN for logical consistency between its subhypotheses and their associated evidences, through the CPT values. If the single- or multi-parameter
sensitivity analysis results suggest that the BN’s posterior output is sensitive to the values of one of
more of the BN’s CPTs, it is necessary to review those CPT values critically with a view to possibly
revising them, after which the single- or multi-parameter sensitivity analysis should be repeated. It
should be noted, however, that this is not equivalent to optimizing the posterior output BN with
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respect to the CPT values. Rather, it is using the sensitivity analysis to highlight possible issues in the
process by which the original CPT values were generated. If repeated reviews of the CPT values do
not lead to a stable posterior output from the BN, this would suggest that the structure of the BN or of
the underlying sub-hypotheses and their associated evidential traces concerning the way in which the
digital crime was committed, may be faulty and require revision. We recall that this was the case with
H4-DE6 in the present study. Note, in particular, that the single-parameter sensitivity results in Table
16 would not necessarily cause concern, while the corresponding multi-parameter results clearly
indicate a serious sensitivity problem. Hence we contend that in general single-parameter sensitivity
analyses are not sufficient in and of themselves and we recommend that multi-parameter sensitivity
analyses should be undertaken as a matter of course.
A final, and more general, consideration is whether there are any special characteristics of digital
forensic analysis which would dictate that the requirements of a sensitivity analysis should differ from
traditional forensics. Because digital forensics is a much more recent discipline than most of
traditional forensics there has been less time for it to establish a corpus of verified knowledge and a
‘track record’ of demonstrably sound methodologies. This means that digital forensics needs to strive
to establish itself as a mature scientific and engineering discipline, and routinely performing sensitivity
analyses is one means of helping to achieve this goal. Indeed, it may result in the analytical methods of
traditional forensics being required to proceed in a similar fashion in order to avoid the imputation of
‘reasonable doubt’ by wily defence lawyers.
Table 16: Some examples of other CPT values yielding large multi-parameter sensitivity values
Subhypothesis

H1

H2

Singleparameter
Sensitivity
value

Digital
Evidence
DE1

0.7

0.3

0.300

DE2

0.3

0.7

0.300

DE3

0.3

0.65

0.7202

DE4

0.7

0.25

0.2770

DE5

0.6

0.3

0.3704

DE6

0.3

0.65

0.7202

DE7

0.4

0.55

0.6094

Multiparameter
Sensitivity value

2.4448

1.8680

6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have described a multi-parameter sensitivity analysis on the BN from the Yahoo!
email case. . As a result of the present analysis, it can be concluded that one the Yahoo! email subhypotheses (H4) exhibits a significant degree of single- and multi-parameter sensitivity and hence its
associated evidence and conditional probabilities should be reviewed. That review indicated that while
the CPT was in fact quite accurate, it represented a poor choice of evidence and sub-hypothesis which
should either be discarded or revised.
More generally, we have shown that the definition and computation of local multi-parameter
sensitivity values is made feasible for BNs describing real-world digital crimes by the use of a
symbolic algebra system such as Matlab [MathWorks, 2011] to evaluate the steepest gradient
analytically.
Finally, we should reiterate that the principal aim of this work is to devise a metric to assess the
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instantaneous (or local) stability of a BN with respect to the values chosen to populate its CPTs. The
value of such a metric is that it enables the digital forensic examiner to know whether or not the set of
conditional probabilities chosen to populate the CPTs of the BN lies on a flat or a steep part of the
hyper-surface in parameter space. The problem of attempting to find local (or global) optima on the
parametric hyper-surface of a BN is a separate issue which has been addressed elsewhere [CD04].
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